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WILLIAM F. WILLIER and ROBERT W. RUSSELL 
§9.1. Introduction. The 1970 SURVEY year witnessed a continua-
tion of legislative activity in the area of consumer protection with the 
enactment of several significant statutes aimed at promoting and pro-
tecting the interests of Massachusetts consumers. These statutes will 
provide the focus of this chapter. 
§9.2. Consumer sales: Warranties: Attempted exclusion or modifi-
cation. Chapter 880 of the Acts of 1970 amends Chapter 106 of the 
General Laws, the Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code,1 by in-
serting Section 2-316A, entitled "Exception as to Exclusion or Modi-
fication of Warranties, etc., in Sales of Consumer Goods." This new 
section, though rather simple in form, substantially circumscribes the 
scope of Section 2-316. Specifically, Section 2-316A states that the pro-
visions of Section 2-316 which allow a seller to disclaim or modify an 
implied warranty of merchantability2 or an implied warranty of fitness 
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§9.2. 1 The UCC was enacted as Chapter 106 of Massachusetts General Laws. 
As corresponding section numbers are identical, all future references, unless other· 
wise indicated, are to the 1962 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
2 UCC §2-314 defines implied warranty of merchantability as follows: 
"(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall 
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant 
with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of 
food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale. 
"(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract descriptions; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the de-
scriptions; and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for whicli such goods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, 
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and 
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may 
require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or 
label if any. 
"(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may 
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade." 
1
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for a particular purposes shall not apply to sales of consumer goods4 
or services or both. The section further limits the capacity of a seller 
or a manufacturer of consumer goodsaQ.d services to exclude or modify 
a consumer's remedies for breach of those warranties.5 Additionally, 
manufacturers of consumer goods are no longer able to so limit con-
sumer's remedies for breach of express warranties6 "unless such manu-
facturer maintains facilities within the commonwealth sufficient to 
provide reasonable and expeditious performance of the warranty 
obligations."7 
. The circumscription of the power of the seller or manufacturer to 
exelude or modify consumer's remedies for breach will have significant 
l.inpact oil the Code provisions allowing for modification of remedy. 
Sc;!ctions 2-718 and 2-719 allow the buyer and seller Hexi.bility in con-
tracting for remedies which are ·not found in the Code itself. Section 
2-718 allows the parties to a contract to fix the amount 1:0 be paid as 
damages in ·the event of a future breach. Section 2-719 provides that 
'the parties may resort to an agreed:to remedy in addiiion to or iii 
substitution for those remedies provided in Article 2. Hoth of these 
sections provide for a determination that the modification or limita-
tion of remedies is unconscionable and therefore unenforceable in the 
event of personal injuries. Section 2-316A renders it unnecessary to 
make this initial determination that an exclusion or modification is 
3 ucc §2-315 defines implied warranty of fitness for a partictllar purpose as 
follows: "Where the seller at the time of contracting has ·reason to know any 
particular p~rpose. for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying 
ori the seller's skill or judgment to ~lect or furnish suitable goods, tP.ere is unless 
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods 
shall be fit for such purpose." . 
4 The definition of consumer goods, which applies to Article 2 of the UCC 
through Section 2-103(3), is given in Section 9-109: "Goods are .... 'consumer goods' 
if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household 
purposes." . 
liThe remedy provisions of the UCC are found in §§2-701 through 2-725. 
6 UCC §2-313 defines express warranty of merchantability as follows: 
''(I) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which 
relates to the goods and becomes part of the ·basis of the bargain creates 
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to thf: affirmation or 
promise. , 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bar· 
gain creates an express warranty that the goods shall o:onform to the 
description. 
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain 
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to 
the sample or model. 
"(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use 
formal words such as 'warrant' or 'guarantee' or that he. have a specific intention 
to make ·a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the ~;oods or a state-
ment purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods 
does not create a warranty." 
7 G.L., c. 106, §2-316A. 
2
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unconscionable. The modification of a remedy, sud~ as the fixing of 
liquidated damages, or the exclusion of a remedy, such as recovery 
for consequential damages, is unenforceable as a result of Section 
2-316A. 
However, the new section does not pra.scribe the addition of reme-
dies not found in the Code. What often appears in boilerplate con-
tracts to be a limitation of remedies constitutes no more than the 
providing of remedies in addition to those otherwise provided by law. 
For example, the law does not provide a remedy calling for replace-
ment of defective parts or repair of goods. It is arguable that such a 
contracted-for remedy is valid if it is considered an addition to the 
Code remedies. This analysis does not do violence to the new section 
because the addition of a separate remedy does not "exclude or 
modify" the existing remedies. So long as it is established that the 
contracted-for remedies are supplementary to the Code r~medies, there 
is no difficulty. 
It is important to distinguish between (a) the implied warranties of 
merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose and (b) ex-
press warranties, which generally arise from oral or written affirma-
tions of fact, descriptions, or samples.8 Attempted disclaimers of 
express warranties are governed by Section 2-316(1) and are not af-
fected by the amendment. As to implied warranties, the amendment is 
prospective in its treatment of attempted disclaimers and exclusions 
or modifications of remedies. Both practices are rendered unenforce-
able per se in consumer sales transactions. 
There are two limitations to recovery for breach of the warranty 
of merchantability or the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 
First, neither warranty can extend for more than four years beyond 
the delivery date under Section 2-725. Second, there is a requirement 
under Sections 2-607 and 2-608 that the buyer give notice of a breach 
to the merchant within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers, or 
should have discovered, the breach. Failure to discover the defects and 
to give notice bars recovery in an action for damages. Except for 
these limitations, the consumer may rely upon implied warranties of 
merchantability and implied warranties of fitness for a particular pur-
pose, notwithstanding any disclaimer or modific;ation made by the 
merchant under Section 2-316. 
The new amendment will not affect the majority of merchants who 
recognize warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular 
purpose and honor them without question. However, those merchants 
who deal in unmerchantable "consumer goods and services"9 will 
feel the brunt of the amendment because it is they who traditionally 
disclaim any and all implied warranties by complying with the pro-
visions of Section 2-316. The mechanics of the disclaimer provisions 
8 ucc: §2-!ll!l. 
9 G.L.; c. 106, §316A. 
3
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of Section 2-316 are important to an understanding of the impact the 
amendment will have upon these less reputable merchants. Warran-
ties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose may be 
excluded or modified by the seller under Section 2-316. To be effective, 
the disclaimer must not be "unconscionable" under Section 2-302. 
Additionally: 
... the language must mention merchantability and in case of 
a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any im-
plied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and 
conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness 
is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties 
which extend beyond the description on the face hen:of."10 
Any or all implied warranties may also be excluded under the follow-
ing conditions: 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise ... by expres-
sions like "as is", "with all faults" or other language which in 
common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion 
of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty; 
and 
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has ex-
amined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or 
has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty 
with regard to defects which an examination ought in the cir-
cumstances to have revealed to him; and 
(c) ... by course of dealing or course of performance or usage 
of trade.U 
Section 2-316(4) allows the merchant to limit remedies for breach of 
warranty in accordance with the provisions of Sections 2-718 and 2-719. 
The first paragraph of Section 2-316A precludes the use of Section 
2-316 to disclaim or modify any implied warranty with respect to the 
sale of consumer goods or services. The second paragraph invalidates 
any limitation of remedies made by the manufacturer "unless such 
manufacturer maintains facilities within the Commonwealth sufficient 
to provide reasonable and expeditious performance of the warranty 
obligations."12 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code has not been construed 
to embrace the sale of consumer services.13 Therefore, the use of the 
10 ucc §2-316(2). 
11 Id. §2-316. The definitions of course of dealing, usage of trade and course of 
performance may be found in §§1-205(1), 1-205(2) and 2-208, respectively. 
12 G.L., c. 106, §2-316A. 
13 See Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Sup. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963), finding that 
the predominant feature of a beauty treatment was a service rather than a sale of 
goods and that under §§2-102, 2-105 and 2-106 a warranty action could not lie; and 
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (19!i4), in which the 
4
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term services in the amendment raises a most perplexing problem of 
statutory construction. One may argue that the amendment, so worded, 
simply broadens the scope of Article 2 to include the sale of consumer 
services. Such an argument, a radical departure from the accepted 
view of Article 2, is not without merit. 
The Code makes specific and repeated reference to the term goods. 
However, a very different impression is conveyed by several provisions. 
At the very outset, the tone of Article 2 is set in rather liberal, if not 
flexible, terms. The scope section begins: "Unless the context other-
wise requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods ... .''14 The 
Code gives no guidance for determining when the "context otherwise 
requires.''15 However, for purposes of the warranty sections, the use 
of the term services in the amendment is suggestive of such a "context." 
Moreover, until the enactment of Section 2-316A, the Code had been 
silent with respect to services. This silence represented neutrality. 
Comment 2 of Section 2-313 states: 
... the warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any 
way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have recog-
nized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts 
or to the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in other 
appropriate circumstances .... 
This comment serves notice that the Code's silence on this subject 
does not prohibit the development of warranty protection through 
case law. It can be fairly said, therefore, that since the Code takes no 
position on whether implied warranties of merchantability or of fit-
ness for a particular purpose arise in a contract for services, the courts 
are free to develop common law principles in this area. However, the 
comment should not be read to suggest that the Code cannot supplant 
specific common law principles. Section 1-103 provides: "Unless dis-
placed by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law 
and equity ... shall supplement its provisions." [Emphasis added.] If 
the amendment is construed as one which considerably broadens the 
scope of Article 2, such a broadening would supersede any inconsistent 
common law principles. Likewise, if the amendment does not take 
on such a construction, it is not inconceivable that common law prin-
ciples could be developed to provide this type of warranty protection 
for consumers. 
Finally, an interpretation of the amendment which expands the 
scope of the warranty provisions to encompass services would comport 
New York Court of Appeals denied recovery based on warranty of merchantability 
of blood, finding that the predominant aspect of the patient-hospital contract was 
for the service of restoring the patient's health. 
14 ucc §2-102. 
15 See generally Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 
Yale L.J. 185 (1967). 
5
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well with language of the Code. The definition of merchant16 is 
flexible enough to include the seller of a service as one who holds him-
self out as having knowledge or skill particular to' the "practice" in-
volved in the transaction. Section 2-314 provides that the implied 
warranty of merchantability applies only to one who is a merchant 
with respect to goods of that kind. Since the definition of merchant 
includes one who "practices,"17 insertion of the service concept into 
Section 2-314 would not do violence to the definitional construction 
of the Code. This interpretation of the term services would also be 
consistent with the latter portion of the scope section whiCh adds 
"nor does this Article impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to 
consumers .... "18 The amendment may be considered a new statutory 
regulation of sales to consumers which originates within the provisions 
of the Code itself. 
Under this view of the amendment, the purchaser of a consumer 
service would be released from the burden of having to prove negli-
gence in the performance of the service in order to recover in an 
action for damages. There would arise, as a matter of law, a warranty 
that the service is merchantable or is fit for a particular purpose. For 
example, an instructor at an Arthur Murray. Dance Studio would 
impliedly warrant that he could teach dancing. If he knew a cus-
tomer wanted to learn the samba, he would warrant that he could 
teach that dance as well. 
This analysis of the amendment, however, turns to a great extent 
on legislative intent. It is possible to interpret the amendment, as 
demonstrated above, to incorporate the sale of services into the Code. 
However, it is questionable that the legislature would intend to so 
drastically alter the scope of Article 2 without expres:;ing a more 
specific mandate to that end. On the other hand, it is likewise 
doubtful that the legislature would include a term so foreign to Article 
2 without intending to create a significant impact. 
A clue to the intention of the legislature may be found in case law 
development. One basic issue at common law has been whether a 
technical sale of goods is required in order to invoke the protection 
of the Code's warranty provisions.19 Much of this litigation has cen-
tered around the transfer of goods incident to a service.:w The trend 
16 uee §2-104(1) defines merchant: "(1) 'Merchant' means a person who deals in 
goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out a~; having knowl-
edge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction·orto whom 
such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent 
or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as 
having such knowledge or skill." 
17 Ibid. 
18 ld. §2-102. 
19 See generally Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-sales Cases, 
57 eolutn. L. Rev. 653 (1957).' 
20See generally Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d '769 (1965); 
6
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of these cases may best be observed in the seminal case of Newmark v. 
Gimble's Inc.,21 involving the patron of a beauty parlor who was 
injured when a waving solution caused her hair to fall out. The 
Supreme Court of New Jersey stated: 
The transaction, in our judgment, is a hybrid partaking of 
incidents of a sale and a service. It is really partly the rendering 
of service, and partly the supplying of goods for a consideration. 
Accordingly, we agree with the Appellate Division that an im-
plied warranty of fitness of the products used in giving the per-
manent wave exists with no less force than it would have in the 
case of a simple sale.22 
The reasoning of the Newmark decision could be incorporated into 
the warranty provisions of the Code through the amendment. Such an 
incorporation would render it unnecessary for Massachusetts courts to 
undertake the rather tedious analysis found in the Newmark decision 
in order to find an implied warranty of goods transferred incident to 
a service. In short, it would codify the view that the legal niceties of 
a sale of goods are not essential to the warranty protection offered by 
the Code. 
Another problem raised by the amendment concerns the use of the 
term manufacturer. The code remains neutral on the issue of vertical 
privity, that is, it does not reach back along the chain of distribution 
assigning liability to the various links.23 The Code does, however, de-
fine the boundaries of horizontal privity, the extent to which parties 
other than the original purchaser may invoke the Code's protection.24 
Until passage of the amendment, the scope of the privity defense was 
determined by the Code's horizontal privity section25 and the appli-
cable case law of the state. A reading of the pertinent cases reveals that 
Massachusetts continues to honor the vertical privity doctrine.26 Thus, 
a manufacturer who does not sell his product directly to the public 
is not bound by any implied warranties of merchantability or of 
fitness for a particular purpose except to his immediate buyer. He is 
free, of course, to extend express warranties as an inducement for the 
consumer to buy his product. 
Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968); Magrine v. 
Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967). 
2154 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969). 
22 ld. at 593, 258 A.2d at 701. 
23 See UCC §2-318, Comment 3. 
24 ld. §2-318. 
211 Ibid. 
26 See generally Pearl v. William Filene's Sons C:o., 317 Mass. 529, 58 N.E.2d 825, 
(1945); Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946); Vessel Judith 
Lee Rose, Inc. v. Paulsen-Webber Cordage Corp., 376 F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1967); 
Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 22, aff'd, 256 F.2d 464 (1st 
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958); Kenney v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 355 
Mass. 604, 246 N.E.2d 649 (1969). Most recently see Necktas v. General Motors Corp., 
1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 843, 259 N.E.2d 234. 
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However, the Massachusetts Commercial Code is no longer neutral 
with respect to vertical privity, unless it is assumed that the term 
manufacturer was written into the amendment inadve:rtently. The 
reference to manufacturers plainly implies that the legislature in; 
tended that the consumer goods manufacturer warrant merchant-
ability and fitness for a particular purpose as a matter of Jaw. In order 
to limit the ability of manufacturers to disclaim implied warranties 
or limit remedies for breach, the legislature necessarily must have 
presupposed an implied warranty obligation on the part of manu-
facturers. Thus, since the amendment treats the manufacturer in the 
same manner as the seller, the legislature appears to have abolished 
the vertical privity defense with respect to the sale of consumer goods. 
§9.3. Motor vehicles: Inspection sticker test: Voidability of con-
tracts of sale. Acts of 1970, c. 635, §1, amends Chapter 90 of the 
General Laws by inserting Section 7N, entitled "Certain Motor Ve-
hicle Sales Voidable Where Vehicle Fails to Pass Inspection Test; 
Procedure." This section allows the purchaser of an automobile in-
tended for immediate personal or family use to "void" the contract 
of sale, notwithstanding any disclaimer of warranty, if the vehicle 
fails to pass the state inspection sticker test within seven days from 
the date of sale. 
In order to void a contract for failure to pass an inspection test, the 
purchaser must comply with certain rather technical requirements: 
first, purchaser must notify the seller of his intention to void the con-
tract and deliver the vehicle to the seller within three days following 
receipt of a written statement that the vehicle failed the inspection 
test; second, and at the same time, he must present to the seller an 
estimate of the repair costs. Additionally, the provisions of this section 
apply only if (1) the reason for failure to issue the sticker was not 
caused by the purchaser's negligent operation of the motor vehicle 
and (2) the repair costs necessary in order to pass the inspection test 
exceed 10 percent of the purchase price of the vehicle. 
Section 7N does not provide the consumer with meaningful pro-
tection. The state inspection system is so perfunctory that it is hardly 
an adequate measure of the merchantability of an automobile. More-
over, inspection commonly fails to discover some of the major prob-
lems, such as engine and transmission difficulties, which often beset 
used automobiles. It is precisely this sort of defect with which the con-
sumer may be most concerned; that the windshield wipers and the 
brake lights function adequately is of relatively little consequence to 
him. Today it is fair to say that most used automobiles are purchased 
for more than $500. One who makes such a purchase, in order to 
trigger the remedy provisions of this statute, would have to demon-
strate that the automobile required over $50 in repair costs to pass 
the inspection test. Furthermore, the used car dealers will probably 
have the automobile inspected or at least provide it with a current 
sticker before the customer sees it, much less purchases and drives it. 
8
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Although the customer would be entitled to have the vehicle re-in-
spected at an inspection station selected by him, there would be little 
or no incentive for him to do so. 
The intent of the statute doubtless was to give minimum protection 
to buyers of used automobiles even when the seller had disclaimed all 
warranties. But Section 7N, in view of the new Section 2-316A added 
to the Massachusetts Commercial Code,1 will have little use or effect. 
It may well suggest an additional criterion for testing merchantability 
under Section 2-314 of the Code. 
The new section also raises the question of what effect it might have 
on a buyer's existing rights and remedies under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. For example, under DCC Section 2-513, the buyer has 
a right to inspect goods before he accepts them. It might well be 
asked whether this new provision indicates how- and how soon-
that inspection can or must be made. While it provides one means and 
one time period, Section 7N clearly does not supersede UCC §2-514. 
Furthermore, even if inspected and accepted, goods are subject to 
the buyer's revocation of acceptance if the defects were difficult to 
discover and substantially impaired the value of the goods.2 A court 
might well use this new provision by analogy to determine "sub-
stantial" impairment of value (over 10 percent of the price). Finally, 
neither the seven-day inspection period nor the manner of notifying 
the seller can logically supplant the Code's more liberal "reasonable 
time" and notice provisions.3 
In short, the section adds little if anything to existing law. It has 
all the earmarks of a law written by automobile dealers, one giving 
buyers the appearance of a new right while effectively denying any 
realistic chance of their exercising it. 
§9.4. Unit pricing. In the 1970 SuRVEY year, the Massachusetts 
legislature enacted the Unit Pricing Law,1 giving the Massachusetts 
§9.3. 1 G.L., c. 106, §2·316A, added by Acts of 1970, c. 880, is discussed in §9.2 
supra. 
2 vee §2-608. 
3 Id. §2-602. 
§9.4. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 885, §1, amending G.L., c. 6, by inserting §ll5A: 
"The council may adopt regulations establishing lists of packaged commodities 
necessary for personal, family or household use to be offered for sale at retail 
and which may not be sold in retail stores unless there is posted in a conspicuous 
place at or near the point of sale the price per pound, pint or other unit or 
measurement of contents and the total sales price. Such regulations shall exempt 
any packaged commodity whose net weight is one whole unit or two whole 
units and which has the retail price plainly marked thereon. No packaged com-
modity shall be included in these regulations which must be individually marked 
with the cost per unit of weight, liquid, or dry measure, as provided in section 
one hundred and eighty-one of chapter ninety-four. Said council may adopt such 
further regulations as are necessary to carry out the intent of this section, pro-
vided that a public hearing shall be held relative to any packaged commodity 
proposed to be regulated. The director of standards shall enforce any regulation 
9
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Consumers' Council authority to require disclosure of price per unit of 
certain packaged commodities "necessary for personal, family or house-
hold use." The statute itself does not directly affect the marketplace 
unless and until the Consumers' Council exercises its authority. The 
statute provides a very limited basis upon which the consumer may 
expect meaningful uniformity in pricing. The permissive wording of 
the section leaves significant discretionary latitude with the council 
in some areas while actually limiting the council's authority in others. 
This statute first provides that the council "may adopt regulations 
establishing lists of packaged commodities, necessary :Eor personal, 
family or household use which may not be sold in retail stores unless 
there is posted in a conspicuous place at or near the point of sale the 
price per pound, pint or other unit or measurement of contents and 
the total sales price." This provision gives no indication of the scope 
of the lists to be established or of the criteria the council may use to 
include or exclude certain commodities. Conceivably, the statute 
could have required unit pricing for all packaged commodities, or 
at least could have set guidelines for the general inclusion of all 
packaged commodities particularly suited to cost-per-unit comparative 
shopping. Both the Model Unit Pricing Law prepared by the National 
Consumer Law Center and a bill offered by Represemative Robert 
Creedon of Brockton2 in the 1970 legislative session provide the 
statutory requirement of unit pricing and authorize the Consumers' 
Council to administer the statutory imperative. The Creedon bill, 
for instance, lists certain consumer commodities for which unit pric-
ing would be required and defines the term appropriate price per 
meamre.3 The National Consumer Law Center's Model Unit Pricing 
Law, in addition to defining the scope of the Consumers' Council's 
(administrator's) authority to promulgate regulations/ also defines 
adopted pursuant to the authorization contained in this section. 'Whoever violates 
any provisions of this section shall for the first offense be punished by a fine of not 
les~ than ten nor more than fifty dollars, and for a subsequent offense not less 
than twenty-five nor more than one hundred dollars. 
"Said council shall annually report to the general court on or before the last 
Wednesday in January of each year relative to any action taken by it pursuant to 
this section in the preceding year. 
"The provisions of this section shall not apply to any retail establishment 
operated by a person as his sole place of business." 
2 House Bill 3020. 
3 Appropriate price per measure is defined in the Creedon bill as "the price per 
pound for non-liquid items where the declaration of quantity is in terms of 
weight, the price per quart where the declaration of quantity is iiJL terms of liquid 
measure, and the price per fifty units for non-liquid items wherf~ the declaration 
of quantity is in terms of numerical or linear measure." 
4 Following public hearings, the administrator may, under Section 6 of the 
National Consumer Law Center's Model Unit Pricing Law, promulgate rules and 
regulations which: "(a) modify or change but do not exclude the measure re-
quired by this [Act, Chapter, Section] if the administrator finds that the required 
measure does not adequately inform the consumer and that the new measure is 
clearly listed on the package or contents in such a manner as to satisfy the re-
10
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the term consumer commodity,G thereby clearly outlining a regulatory 
mandate to the administrator and facilitating the conduct of his 
task. 
The unit pricing statute provides that "such regulations shall 
exempt any packaged commodity whose net weight is one whole unit 
or two whole units and which has the retail price plainly marked." 
This scheme of exemption may tend to create confusion for the shop-
per by requiring him to ascertain which commodities are priced by 
unit weight in a conspicuous place and which ones are priced in a 
similar manner on the package itself. Additionally, this scheme re-
quires the consumer to compute the cost per unit for those items 
packaged in two whole units. 
The statute further provides that "no packaged commodity shall be· 
included in these regulations which must be individually marked with 
the cost per unit weight, liquid, or dry measure as provided in Section 
181 of Chapter 94." General Laws, c. 94, §181 contains the traditional 
prohibitions against the sale of food in packages unless the net quan-
tity of the contents is plainly and conspicuously marked on the out-
side of the package, and it requires that meat, poultry or edible fish, 
except soft-shelled clams and oysters, be sold in packages on which 
there is plainly and conspicuously marked the price per pound of the 
contents and the total sales price. 
The statute also allows the council to adopt such further regula-
tions as are "necessary to carry out the intent of this section, provided 
that a public hearing shall be held relative to any packaged com-
modity proposed to be regulated." Any regulation which the council 
may promulgate would be controlled by the restrictions imposed by 
the statute. Thus, the council probably could neither require cost-
per-unit labeling on all packages individually nor summarily require 
cost-per-unit disclosures for all commodities. 
Finally, the statute exempts the sole proprietorship store from the 
provisions of the section.o Although the sole proprietor is least able 
quirement of Section 1453, Title 15, U.S. Code; (b) provide for disclosure of the 
price per measure which is more effective than the means prescribed in Section 4; 
(c) adds to but does not exclude the commodities subject to the requirements of 
this [Act, Chapter, Section]." 
5 The National Consumer Law Center's Model Unit Pricing Law defines 
consumer commodity as "any food, drug, device or cosmetic and any other article, 
product, or commodity of any kind or class (a) which is customarily produced for 
sale to retail sales agencies or instrumentalities for consumption by individuals, 
for use by individuals for purposes of personal care or in the performance of 
services ordinarily rendered within the household, and (b) which usually is con-
sumed or expended in the course of such consumption or use, and (c) as to which 
a unit of measurement as described in Section 5 is employed on the package or 
label or in the display or exposure for sale or as the means of making the offer 
for sale or calculating the price." 
8 Another bill presented by Representative Creedon (House' 6022) contained a 
provision that any sole proprietorship store would receive an exemption from unit 
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to pay the cost of computation and disclosure of unit pricing re-
quirements, he most often deals with the poorest members of the 
consuming public and traditionally engages in the practice of inflat-
ing prices. It could be convincingly argued, therefore, that the sole 
proprietor should be a prime target for unit pricing legislation. 
The authority to enforce any regulation made pursuant to the Unit 
Pricing Law is granted to the director of standards. A penalty in the 
form of a mild fine is provided for first and subsequent violations of 
the statute,7 but consumers are given no remedy for failure of a mer-
chant to comply. 
At this writing, the Consumer's Council has held one public hear-
ing and has promulgated regulations which are set out as an Appendix 
at the end of this chapter. These regulations prescribe the size of the 
unit for which the price is to be disclosed; require that the disclosure 
be on a conspicuous orange tag uniformly used by all merchants; and 
list groups of commodities generically to be covered by the law, differ-
ing groups to be "phased in" over three periods of time. Thus, the 
regulations generally achieve the goals of the Model Unit Pricing Act. 
The regulations allow the council to grant extensions of time to in-
dividual merchants who, for cause shown, cannot meet the require-
ments. Such extensions cannot exceed 30 days. 
§9.5. Contracts: Right of buyer to cancel. Chapte:r 272 of the 
Acts of 1970 amends Chapter 93 of the General Laws by adding Sec-
tion 48. This section extends the right of cancellation in a retail in-
stallment sales contract1 to include cash sales, provided: (I) it is an 
agreement for the sale or lease of goods, or the rendering of services, 
primarily for personal, family or household purposes; (2) the agree-
ment is valued in excess of $25; (3) the agreement is consummated at 
a place other than the address of the seller or lessor; (4) the buyer, 
not later than midnight of the third business day following execution 
of the agreement, notifies the seller or lessor that he is canceling. 
Each agreement must be in writing and signed by the seller or 
lessor. Additionally, each must contain the seller's or lessor's address 
and all the terms agreed to by the parties, or required by law, in-
cluding the following statement: 
You may cancel this agreement if it has been consummated by 
a party thereto at a place other than an address of the :>eller which 
may be his main office or branch thereof, by a written notice di-
pricing disclosure requirements only if· its gross annual income did not exceed 
$500,000. 
7 The statute provides: "Whoever violates any provisions of this section shall 
for the first offense be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than 
fifty dollars, and for a subsequent offense by a fine of not less than twenty-five 
nor more than one hundred dollars." 
§9.5. 1 G.L., c. 255D, §14. 
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rected to the seller at his main or branch office by ordinary mail 
posted, by telegram sent or by delivery, not later than midnight 
of the third business day following the signing of this agreement.2 
The time period during which the buyer may cancel does not 
commence unless and until a copy of the agreement containing all 
the terms agreed to, or required by law, has been delivered to the 
buyer or lessee. 
Within ten days after cancellation of an agreement pursuant to this 
section, the seller or lessor must: (1) refund to the buyer all deposits 
including any down payment, less any reasonable costs actually in-
curred in making the goods ready for sale; (2) redeliver any goods 
traded in on account or in contemplation of the agreement; (3) return 
any copies of the agreement signed by the buyer with a notation that 
it has been cancelled. 
The seller or lessor is entitled to reclaim any goods received by the 
buyer under the agreement. The buyer must return any goods when-
ever possible, or hold them for the seller. 
Measurement of the three-day right of cancellation may present 
several interesting problems. The three-day period during which 
the buyer may cancel the agreement begins on the first business day 
following execution of the agreement. To illustrate, if an agreement 
were entered into on a Saturday, the three-day period would begin 
to run on the following Monday. Assuming that that Monday hap-
pens to be a holiday, the period would then not begin until Tuesday. 
The question arises, what would be the latest time the buyer could 
effectively cancel the agreement? The section provides that a notice 
posted, telegraphed, or delivered to the seller at his place of business 
within three business days is valid. Since the ordinary meaning of the 
term posted is the placing of a letter in a mailbox, a notice so placed 
at midnight on Thursday would comply with the section. A telegram 
sent at that time or a letter delivered to the seller's place of business 
would also constitute a valid cancellation. If the mail is taken from 
the mailbox on Friday, it is entirely possible that the seller would 
not receive the notice until the following Monday. From the seller's 
point of view, the time between the making of an agreement and the 
receipt of a valid notice of cancellation could be considerably longer 
than three days. 
A further question concerns the effect of a posted letter or a de-
livered notice which the seller claims never to have received. The 
problem of proving that the letter was posted or that the notice was 
delivered by midnight of the third business day would be difficult. 
Since Western Union retains a record of each message sent and the 
time of transmission, it may be a good practice to encourage the use 
of telegrams for the purpose of cancellation. 
2 Id. c. 93, §48. 
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The new section affords particular protection to the consumer who 
is solicited for sale in the home. The three-day right of cancellation 
allows the consumer to reflect upon the desirability of the purchase. 
The policy rationale behind the section is that consumer:; are particu-
larly susceptible to the high-pressure sales tactics often employed by 
so-called direct sellers. Perhaps the underlying assumption in this 
section is that the consumer has given only a qualified assent to the 
contract and may withdraw that assent within three days. One might 
wonder whether the consumer who contracts in a retail store should 
not be afforded the same protection~ Although he has actively sought 
out the retail merchant, he is also susceptible to high-pressure sales 
techniques and is therefore liable to purchase goods which he cannot 
afford or which he does not need. 
The National Consumer Act3 adopts this more innovative approach 
to the problem. The NCA distinguishes home solicitation transactions 
from ordinary retail transactions entered into at the merchant's place 
of business, but affords the consumer protection in both instances. 
The home solicitation transaction, referred to as an "outside con-
sumer approval transaction," is treated as a "sale on approval."4 In 
order to complete this type of transaction, the consumer is required 
to affirm it in writing within three business days.5 The consumer in an 
ordinary retail transaction, referred to as an "inside [consumer] ap-
proval transaction," is granted a three-day right of cancellation.6 In 
the NCA, it is assumed that consumers purchase good:; and services 
only to satisfy real needs and desires and that they should not be bound 
to purchases which, within a reasonable time, they find are not de-
sirable or are not needed. 
Since many reputable retail stores, as a matter of good customer 
relations, allow up to a seven-day period in which a customer may 
return items purchased, an extension of the protection offered by 
the new section to include transactions entered into at the seller's 
place of business would not be disruptive of ordinary busiiness practices. 
In fact, such an extension would serve to require the less reputable 
merchants to provide a minimal "cooling-off" period. Moreover, it 
would create more symmetry in the existing law which allows a three-
day right of cancellation in all consumer transactions, 7 except retail 
3 The National Consumer Act [hereinafter cited as NCA] is a model act prepared 
by the National Consumer Law Center, Boston College Law School, Brighton, 
Mass. 02135. 
4 NCA §2.501'(2), Comment I. 
5 ld. §2.502. Section 2.502(6) provides that the consumer need not affirm in writ-
ing within three business days if the consumer requests the money, property, or 
services without delay in an emergency. 
6 Id. §2.505. Section 2.505(1) provides that the consumer is not granted this 
three-day right of cancellation if tlie consumer requests the money, property, or 
services without delay in an emergency. 
7 G.L., c. 2550, §14, which provides for a three-day right of cancellation on 
retail installment sales agJ"eements. 
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Chapter 457 of the Acts of 1970 may be viewed as a companion to 
Chapter 202, discussed in Section 9.6 supra. The nature of consumer 
financing is such that most transactions are arranged in one of two 
ways. The merchant may extend credit himself and transfer the con· 
sumer's obligations to a third party, or he may require the consumer 
to arrange his own financing from a lender or by other third·party 
arrangements. The discussion of Chapter 202 involved the first situa· 
tion; the present discussion of "interlocking sales and loans" concerns 
the second. 
From a merchant's point of view, one of the primary considerations 
in the financing of a sales contract is the creation of insulation between 
the obligation and the defenses. Traditionally, the holder in due 
course doctrine has provided such insulation.2 In a typical transaction, 
the merchant would negotiate3 the note representing the consumer's 
obligation to a holder.4 The holder, in turn, would seek to enforce the 
obligation against the consumer. The defenses the consumer may have 
on the contract, for example, breach of warranty of merchantability,5 
would not be available to him against the holder. The result of this 
arrangement was mutually satisfactory to the merchant who has 
received payment and to the holder who is free from the consumer's 
defenses, but it left the consumer without protection. The legislature 
has provided the consumer with a solution to this problem in the form 
of the two sections discussed in Section 9.6 supra.6 
The merchant and the holder, faced with the impossibility of 
creating insulation from the consumer's defenses by way of the tradi· 
tiona! arrangement, may choose to require the consumer to arrange 
his own financing and pay cash for consumer items. The same result 
is achieved. The merchant is paid in cash, and the creditor as a non· 
participant in the sale or lease is free of the consumer's defenses. In 
other relative, by blood or marriage, of the individual or his spouse who shares 
the same home with the individual." 
Person related to "with respect to an organization" is defined as "(a) a person 
directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by or under common control with 
the organization, (b) an officer or director of the organization or a person perform· 
ing similar functions with respect to the organization or to a person related to the 
organization, (c) the spouse of a person related to the organization, and (d) a 
relative by blood or marriage of a person related to the organization who shares the 
same home with him." 
2 For an exhaustive discussion of the holder in due course doctrine see Note, 
Judicial and Statutory Limitations on the Rights of a "Holder in Due Course," 11 
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 90 (1969). 
3 UCC §3-202 defines negotiations as "the transfer of an instrument in such form 
that the transferee becomes a holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is 
negotiated by delivery with any necessary endorsement; if payable to bearer it is 
negotiated by delivery." 
4 Id. §1·201(20) defines holder as "a person who is in possession of a document 
of title or an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or endorsed to 
him or to his order or to bearer or in blank." 
5 Id. §2-314. 
6 G.L., c. 255, §12C; Acts of 1970, c. 202, adding §25A to G.L., c. 255D. 
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response to this type of arrangement, the legislature has extended the 
scope of the consumer's contractual defenses to include the creditor 
who "participated in" or "was directly connected with" the consumer 
sale or lease transaction. 
This new statute raises a number of questions. One involves the 
interstate transaction in which the sale or lease occurs in one state and 
the credit is extended in another. For example, if a Massachusetts 
resident uses his bank credit card issued in Massachusetts to obtain 
goods or services in New York, would Massachusetts or New York law 
govern his rights to raise defenses against the issuer? The question can 
be reversed: May non-Massachusetts residents similarly avail them-
selves of the new section as to purchases made within Massachusetts 
using out-of-state financing? 
The answers inevitably must turn upon how these consumer-defense 
issues arise, and in what forum. Clearly, the new section ~.hould apply 
to the first kind of transaction- credit extended by a Massachusetts 
creditor to a Massachusetts resident though the proceeds are used out 
of state. The forum would doubtless be Massachusetts. 
The second transaction is more difficult. The statute seems aimed at 
creditors and not at the transaction itself. An argument can be made 
that it does not apply to non-Massachusetts credit card issuers or 
lenders. Further, the forum is likely to be the creditor's and debtor's 
state rather than Massachusetts. On the other hand, the law can be said 
to protect consumers doing business in Massachusetts irrespective of 
the locus of their source of credit. A Massachusetts court could so hold 
with little conflict of laws difficulty. 
The variations on this theme do not stop there. It is possible for a 
nonresident to possess a credit card from a Massachusetts bank which 
he uses in another state, or for a Massachusetts resident to possess a 
credit card from a bank in another state which he uses in Massa-
chusetts. It is plain that the courts must devise new conflict of laws 
rules to deal both with the relatively new three-party interstate credit 
transaction and statutes such as the instant one, which is certain to 
become law in other states.T 
Another question unanswered by the new statute is how the con-
sumer asserts his "defenses" either apart from, or in connection with, 
a court proceeding. There is no requirement of notice to either 
creditor or merchant prior to such assertion. Of course, if the defense 
is breach of warranty, Section 2-602 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
requires notice to the seller. Can the consumer in any case simply 
remain silent toward the creditor and wait to be sued? The term 
defenses indicates that he can. As a practical matter, however, he will 
want to attempt to mollify the creditor before legal action is taken and 
will somehow inform the creditor of his dispute with the merchant. 
T See, for instance, N.Y. S. INT. 5172, A. INT. 6552. See also the proposed Federal 
Fair Credit Billing Act §652. 
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installment sales of automobiless and those in cash initiated at the 
seller's place of business. 
§9.6. Installment sales agreements: Real and personal defenses. 
Chapter 202 of the Acts of 1970 amends Chapter 255D of the General 
Laws by inserting a new section which extends the scope of defenses 
available to the retail buyer.1 Under Section 25A, the retail installment 
buyer may assert against the holder of a retail installment sales agree-
ment all the defenses, real and personal, he may assert against the 
installment seller. 
The provisions found in this new section are intertwined with 
similar provisions in G.L., c. 255, §12C. Section 12C provides that a 
note executed with a contract for sale of consumer goods shall be 
labeled "Consumer Note" and shall not be a negotiable instrument 
within the meaning of Article 3 of Uniform Commercial Code.2 Section 
l2C further provides that any person who obtains a note without such 
a label shall be punished by a fine3 and shall not recover any finance, 
delinquency, collection, repossession or refinancing charges in any 
action based on the contract. An instrument which is properly labeled 
and thereby not negotiable is automatically removed from the purview 
of Article 3. 
Section 3-202(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code defines negotiation 
as "the transfer of an instrument in such a form that the transferee 
becomes a holder .... " Comment I to Section 3-202 makes it clear 
that "[n]egotiation is merely a special form of transfer, the importance 
of which lies entirely in the fact that it makes the transferee a holder . 
. . . " Thus, since under G.L., c. 255, §l2C, a consumer note is not 
negotiable, a person who takes such a note would not qualify as a 
holder, much less a holder in due course. Under this analysis, the taker 
would be subject to the buyer's defenses. 
General Laws, c. 255, §12C, has always posed some interesting 
questions: (l) Can there be a holder in due course of an instrument not 
properly labeled "consumer note" and taken in violation of the section 
by a credit seller? (2) While subjecting a person who "obtains" such 
an instrument to both civil and criminal penalties, does the statute so 
subject subsequent takers who also can be said to "obtain" the 
instrument? (3) The prohibition or recovery of any finance charge is 
not limited exclusively to one who "obtains" the instrument and, if it 
is to have any effect, would it not have to apply to subsequent takers 
as well as sellers? (4) Does a buyer in a consumer credit transaction 
have a cause of action against a seller or subsequent taker for a viola-
tion of the statute? 
Even in view of these questions, the purpose of new Section 25A in 
s Id. c. 255B. 
§9.6. 1 In regard to motor vehicles, Acts of 1970, c. 107, amends G.L., c. 255B, §1. 
2 UCC §§!l-101 et seq. 
3.The applicable fine is not less than $100 nor more than $500. 
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Chapter 255D is not entirely clear. Section 10 of that chapter already 
prohibits any waiver-of-defense clauses in a retail installment sale 
agreement, and Section 26 subjects holders to all of the provisions of 
that chapter. These provisions, along with Section 12C of Chapter 255, 
were undoubtedly intended to achieve the same result as the instant 
section. Therefore the enactment of the new section raises some 
question about the status of the previously existing law. Are contracts 
which were entered into prior to the effective date of the new section 
now subject to doubt in terms of legislative intent? This seems to be a 
case where the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting Section 
12C of Chapter 255 in 1961 and Chapter 255D in 1966 was obscured 
by bad draftsmanship. The legislature attempted to clarify these 
provisions with the enactment of Section 25A. However, it is clear 
from this analysis that appropriate amendment to the existing provi-
sions would have been a preferable means of achieving that end. 
§9.7. Interlocking sales and loans: Consumer's defenses. Chapter 
457 of the Acts of 1970 amends Chapter 255 of the General Laws by 
the addition of Section 12F, entitled "Certain Creditors iin Consumer 
Transactions Subject to Debtor's Defenses." Under this section, dealing 
with what are sometimes called "interlocking sales and loans," if a 
creditor "knowingly participated in" or "was directly connected with" 
a consumer sale or lease transaction, he is subject to all the defenses 
of the buyer arising from the consumer sale or lease for which the 
proceeds of the loan are used. 
To determine whether a creditor knowingly participated in or was 
directly connected with a consumer sale or lease, the section offers the 
following unqualified criteria: 
... (a) he was a person related to the seller or lessor; (b) the 
seller or lessor prepared documents used in connection with the 
loan; (c) the creditor supplied forms to the seller or lessor which 
were used by the consumer in obtaining the loan; (d) the creditor 
was specifically recommended by the seller or lessor to the bor-
rower and made two or more loans in any calendar year, the 
proceeds of which are used in transactions with the same seller or 
lessor, or with a person related to the same seller or lessor; or (e) 
the creditor was the issuer of a credit card which may be used by 
the consumer in the sale or lease transaction as a result of a prior 
agreement between the issuer and the seller or lessor. 
The section also defines certain terms as used therein.l 
§9.7. 1 Organization is defined in G.L., c. 255, §12F, as "a corporation, govern-
ment or governmental subdivision or agency, trust, estate, partnership, cooperative, 
or association." 
Person related to "with respect to an individual'" is defined as "(a) the spouse of 
the individual. (b) a brother, brother-in-law, sister, or sister-in-law of the individual, 
(c) an ancestor or lineal descendant of the individual or his spouse, and (d) any 
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For his own protection, he should notify both parties in writing, 
setting forth his defense. 
The term subject to defenses indicates that the consumer may only 
use his remedies defensively against the creditor, although he may 
otherwise have an affirmative cause of action against the merchant. 
This language does not preclude a counterclaim in a suit by the 
creditor, and the statute sets no limits on the amount recoverable. 
Since the statute is defensive only, it is arguable that recovery must be 
limited to the amount of the initial obligation to the creditor. Any 
further relief must come from the merchant. 
In credit card transactions, this procedure is not as onerous as it 
appears, since the issuer's agreement with the merchant usually allows 
!'recourse," or return of the obligation to the merchant, so that the 
merchant and consumer might resolve their differences between them-
selves. In the straight loan transaction, the effect of the statute may be 
to require that the lender secure the merchant's obligation as a surety 
so that the same result will obtain. In any event, the most important 
right of the consumer- not to pay when he has been cheated- has 
been preserved. 
§9.8. Credit cards: Liability of holder. Chapter 665 of the Acts 
of 1970 amends Chapter 255 of the General Laws by striking out old 
Section 12E and inserting in its place a new, slightly different section. 
The new Section 12E, like its 1968 counterpart,1 defines the liability of 
a holder of a credit card. The section provides that absolutely no 
liability attaches to the holder of an unsolicited2 credit card and that 
the maximum liability for the unauthorized use of an accepted credit 
card is $100. 
The definition of an accepted credit card is, then, the central pro-
vision of the act. Truth-in-Lending disclosure under Chapter 140C of 
the General Laws is a prerequisite to the acceptance of a credit card. 
Any cardholder who has not received a timely disclosure of the credit 
terms required by Chapter 140C cannot be said to have accepted the 
card and apparently may use it without fear of liability. 
New Section 12E provides that, once the credit cost disclosure re-
quirements are satisfied, a credit card may be considered "accepted" 
when one or more of the following events has occurred: 
(i) the cardholder has requested the card in writing; 
(ii) the cardholder has signed a cardholder agreement; 
(iii) the cardholder has had his picture taken for imprinting 
on the card; 
(iv) the cardholder has signed or has used, or authorized another 
§9.8. 1 Acts of 1968, c. 394, §1, added the original §12E. 
2 This is not to imply that an unsolicited credit card cannot become accepted. An 
unsolicited card is defined as one which has been mailed or distributed to a card-
holder but which has not been accepted. Under the section, once a card is de-
termined "accepted" it is no longer considered "unsolicited." 
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to use, the card for purposes of obtaining money, property, labor 
or services on credit; 
(v) the card has been issued in substitution or renewal of an 
accepted credit card; or 
(vi) the card has been issued in connection with a merger, 
acquisition or the like of card issuers or credit card services in 
substitution for an accepted credit card. 
A cardholder3 may be held liable for the unauthorized use4 of a 
credit card under certain circumstances set out in Section 12E(2). This 
subsection provides that the card issuer may impose liability on a 
cardholder only if: (1) the card is an accepted credit card; (2) the 
liability imposed is not in excess of $100; (3) the card issuer gives 
adequate notice to the cardholder of the potential liability; (4) the 
unauthorized use occurs before the cardholder has notHied the card 
issuer of the loss or theft of the card or of any unauthorized use, and; 
(5) the card issuer has provided a method whereby the user of the 
credit card can be identified as the person authorized to use it, in-
cluding but without limitation a place on the card for the photo or 
signature of the holder. 
It should be reiterated that the new section 12E adds the stipulation 
that the disclosure required by the Massachusetts Truth-in-Lending 
Act5 be made before a credit card may be considered "accepted." 
From the consumer's perspective, this change strengthens the 1968 
amendment. In a different sense, however, the new section tends to 
weaken the protection afforded by the 1968 amendment by removing 
the one-year time limitation on the substitution of a new card. Under 
the new provision, a person who has become the holde:r of an "ac-
cepted" credit card may have "accepted" substitution cards sent to him 
at any time, notwithstanding the fact that he may have long since 
discarded the original. Furthermore, the new section adds two new 
elements to the definition of an accepted credit card. The first is that 
the cardholder has signed a cardholder agreement; the second, that he 
has had his picture taken for imprinting on the card. 
The new Section 12E also defines an unsolicited credit card as one 
which the issuer has mailed or distributed but which has not been 
accepted. In addition, it redundantly underscores the conditions of 
liability set out in subsection (2) by stating that "[N]o finance charge 
shall be imposed for credit extended on an unsolicited ctedit card." 
The 1968 version of Section 12E was designed to discourage the 
3 Cardholder is defined in §12E as "any person to whom a credit card is issued 
or any person who has agreed with the card issuer to pay obligations arising from 
the issuance of a credit card to another person." 
4 Unauthorized use is defined in §12E as "a use of a credit card by a person other 
than the cardholder who does not have actual, implied or apparent authority 
for such use and from which the cardholder receives no benefit." 
5 G.L., c. 140C. 
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mailing of unsolicited credit cards by placing liability on the issuer 
until such time as the card was accepted. However, unsolicited plastic 
continued to flood the Massachusetts consumer market apparently 
because the credit industry found that the liability imposed by the 
1968 section was not prohibitive. One would expect the 1970 amend-
ment to strengthen its predecessor, but, as discussed above, the new 
section makes only minor changes. 
Some of the weakness inherent in Massachusetts credit card legisla-
tion, however, may be rectified by federal legislation. The new 
federal provisions concerning credit cards amend the Federal Truth 
in Lending Act6 by the addition of several sections. The main 
point of difference between the Massachusetts and the federal legisla-
tion is simply that the federal provisions prohibit the issuance 
of a credit card except in response to a request or in renewal or sub-
stitution of an accepted card.7 The Massachusetts law makes no such 
prohibition. The federal law, however, apparently does not preclude 
the acceptance of an unsolicited credit card. This conclusion is drawn 
from the definition of an accepted credit card. This includes, in 
pertinent part, the instance when a cardholder "has signed or has used, 
or authorized another to use," the card.s Thus, under both state and 
federal law, a cardholder could be held liable for the personal or 
authorized use of an unsolicited credit card. He could also be held 
liable for the unauthorized use of an "unsolicited" but "accepted" 
credit card, if the issuer complies with the appropriate provisions set 
out in each statute.9 The federal act, however, limits liability for un-
authorized use to $50.10 Since it would be inconsistent with federal law 
to apply the Massachusetts ceiling of $100, the federal limitation would 
control.ll 
The strength of the federal provisions is found in the criminal 
liability section of the Truth in Lending Act.12 The sanctions imposed 
by this section are presumably sufficient to discourage the credit 
industry from mailing unrequested credit cards. In Massachusetts, six 
bills providing similar prohibitions against the mailing of unsolicited 
credit cards and simliar liability for violation were initiated in the 
6 Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq. (1968) [here-
inafter cited as FCCPA]. 
7 Pub. L. No. 91-508, §502, adding FCCPA §132. (Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§501-503, 
amends the FCCPA) [hereinafter citation will be to the relevant FCCPA section]. 
8 FCCPA §103(1). 
9 G.L., c. 255, §12E(2); FCCPA §133(a). 
10 FCCPA §133(a). 
11 Id. §111(a) provides that "[t]his title does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt 
any creditor from complying with, the laws of any State relating to the disclosure 
of information in connection with credit transactions, except to the extent that 
those laws are inconsistent with the provisions of this title or regulations there-
under, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency." 
12 Id. §112. 
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1970 legislative session.13 Although the approach in each of these bills 
would provide more protection than the present statutory scheme in 
Massachusetts, such proposals contain a fundamental weakness. They 
require state enforcement agencies to police the consumer market for 
violations, and hence are effective only to the extent that these agencies 
are successful in finding and prosecuting violators. Moreover, this type 
of legislation does not deal directly with the problem. Despite the 
severity of the penalties or the efficiency of the enforcement, the target 
of an unsolicited mailing may become liable for charges by simply 
using the card. For many consumers, especially those unaccustomed to 
the luxury of credit, this is the danger which accompanies unsolicited 
credit cards. It is all too easy to use a credit card without reflecting on 
the consequences. It is this concern which should be reflected in 
legislation. 
A bill sponsored by Representative Scalli for Attorney General 
Quinn in the 1970 legislative session would have surmounted the 
problems discussed above.14 The Quinn propos;:tl, by eliminating liabil-
ity for debts resulting from the use of an unsolicited credit card, would 
effectively stem the flow of unrequested cards. As a result, the en-
forcement agencies would not have to police the consumer market, and 
consumers would be released from the burden of dealing with un-
solicited cards and the financial difficulties so often incurred. In short, 
the bill proposed by the attorney general would have been a most ap-
propriate response to the problems generated by the unsolicited credit 
card. 
The relationship between the new Section 12E and federal law is 
sure to cause some confusion. As noted above, the Massachusetts section 
requires disclosure of credit terms pursuant to Chapter 140(c) of the 
General Laws before a card may be considered accepted. The new 
federal law makes no such requirement, but presumably would provide 
the cardholder with the remedy for disclosure violation found else-
where in the act.15 Whether a cardholder who did not receive Truth-
in-Lending disclosures could claim he had no liability for charges 
under the Massachusetts section and also claim money d2cmages under 
the federal law is a perplexing question. Unlike the issue of liability 
for the unauthorized use of an accepted credit card, the Massachusetts 
remedy for failure to disclose credit terms is not inconsistent with the 
federal remedy. It is therefore entirely possible that a cardholder 
could utilize both remedies.1s 
Massachusetts has received an exemption from the general provisions 
13 House Bills 50, 90, 375, 1397, 2843 and 3999. 
14 House Bill 2846. 
15 FCCPA §130 provides for damages of "twice the amount of the finance charge 
in connection with the transaction, except that the liability under this paragraph 
shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000 .... " 
16 See note 11 supra. 
22
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1970 [1970], Art. 12
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1970/iss1/12
§9.9 CONSUMER PROTECTION 209 
of the federal act,17 but it has not received an exemption from the 
provisions of the new sections dealing with credit cards. Would a card-
holder seeking damages for disclosure violations have to bring his 
cause· of action under the federal act? The. new federal credit card. 
provisions are a part of the Truth in Lending Act. It would therefore 
seem that the remedy for violation of the federal provisions would be 
entirely federal in nature. Moreover, since the Massachusetts Truth in 
Lending Act does not deal with credit cards, it would seem unlikely 
that the cardholder could allege a state cause of action. 
§9.9. Unfair. or deceptive debt collection. Acts of 1970, c. 883, §1, 
amends Chapter 93 of the General Laws by adding Section 49. The 
new Section 49 generally prohibits unfair, deceptive or unreasonable 
debt collection techniques employed against a debtor who has incurred 
a debt primarily for personal, family or household purposes. Certain 
specific practices are declared to be of the kind prohibited. Failure to 
comply with the provisions of this section constitutes an unfair or 
deceptive act or practice under Chapter 93A of the General Laws.1 The 
authority· to enforce the provisions is primarily vested in the attorney 
general. The commissioner of banks, however, will also exercise signifi-
cant informal influence over retail creditors who violate this section 
through his authority under Chapter 255D of the General Laws. 
Acts of 1970, c. 883, §2, further. amends Chapter 93 of the ,General 
Laws by substituting a new Section 28. This new section instructs any 
person or collection agency doing business for which a bond is required 
(by Section 24 of Chapter 93) to give a, complete account to the person 
or organization from whom an indebtedness was taken for collection, 
17 Pursuant to FCCPA §12!1 and Supp. II to Regulation Z §226.12. 
§9.9. 1 G.L., c. 9!1, §49, states that "such collection or attempt to collect shall be 
deemed unfair, deceptive or unreasonable if: 
"(a) The creditor communicates, threatens to communicate or implies the fact 
of such debt or alleged .debt to a person other than the person who might reason-
al!ly be expected to be liable therefor, except with the written permission of the 
alleged debtor. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prohibit a creditor 
from notifying a debtor of the fact that the creditor may report a debt or alleged 
debt to a credit bureau or engage an agent or an attorney for the purpose of 
collecting the debt or alleged debt. For tlle purposes of this paragraph, the use of 
language on envelopes indicating that the communication relates to the collection 
of a debt shall be deemed a communication of such debt or alleged debt. 
"(b) The creditor communicates directly with the _alleged debtor after notifi-
cation from an attorney representing such debtor that all further communica-
tions relative to the debt should be addressed to him. 
"(c) The creditor communicates with the alleged debtor in. such a manner as 
to harass or embarrass the alleged debtor, including, but not limited to com-
munication at an unreasonable hour, with unreasonable frequency, by threats of 
violence, by use of offensive language, or by threats of any action which the 
creditor in . the usual course of business does not in fact take. 
"(d) The creditor communicates with alleged debtors through the use of forms 
or instruments that simulate the form and appearance of judicial process." 
For an extensive analysis of G.L., c. 9l!A, see 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law c. 8. 
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and to turn over the proceeds of such collection within 30 days upon 
written demand. Additionally, new Section 28 requires the person or 
collection agency to return any claims within 30 days after written 
request and after payment of any amounts that may be owing to the 
person or collection agency. Failure to comply with the provisions of 
new Section 28 or with the provisions of any accompanying regulations 
also constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice under Chapter 93A. 
In addition to the penalties found in Chapter 93A, the violators of 
these provisions may also be fined by the commissioner of banks.2 In 
enforcing this section the commissioner of banks has broad powers to 
regulate the activities of credit collection agencies.3 The Federal Trade 
Commission likewise exercises considerable regulative power over 
these agencies, and also regulates the debt collection prartices of un-
licensed retail merchants.4 In Massachusetts these unlicensed individ-
uals are regulated by the attorney general.6 To the e:xtent to which 
the commissioner of banks regulates debt collection in the Common-
wealth, either formally6 or informally,7 it may be worthwhile to com-
pare his regulations with those of the FTC. 
In substance, these regulations are very similar. Each set of regula-
tions requires disclosure. The FTC requires disclosure of purpose on 
all literature sent to a debtor.8 Massachusetts requires the collection 
agency in communicating with debtors to use the exact name in which 
the banking commissioner granted the license to operate. Massachusetts 
also prohibits the use of the collection agency's name on the return 
address, requiring instead the agency's business address and telephone 
number. The central theme in both sets of regulations is the prohibition 
of unfair or deceptive practices.9 Massachusetts prohibits communi-
cations which are at an unreasonable hour or which are calcu-
lated to harass the debtor.l0 Both the Massachusetts and the FTC 
regulations prohibit conduct which implies that the collection agency 
is a branch of or in any way connected with an agency of govern-
ment.U Additionally, the Massachusetts regulations include a prohibi-
tion against representing or implying that an agency is an attorney.12 
The FTC regulations prohibit the use of organizational titles or trade 
2 G.L., c. 93, §28, provides for a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for 
not more than three months, or both. 
3 ld. §§24-28. 
4 16 C.F.R. pt. 237, §§237.0-237.6 [hereinafter cited as FTC Regs.]. 
6 G.L., c. 93, §49(d). 
6Jd. §§24-28. 
7 As a result of the authority created by G.L., c. 2550, §31. 
s FTC Regs. §237.2(b). 
9 See Mass. Banking Reg. No. 18. See also FTC Regs. §237.1, which states: "An 
industry member shall not use any deceptive representation or deceptive means to 
collect or attempt to collect debts or to obtain information concerning debtors." 
10 Mass. Banking Reg. No. 16. 
11 Id. No. 5; FTC Regs. §237 .!l. 
12 Mass. Banking Reg. No. 5. 
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status which imply that an organization is a credit bureau or a col-
lection agency when in fact it is not.1a The FTC regulations also 
prohibit misrepresentation of the service which is rendered by a collec-
tion agency or a credit bureau.14 
The regulations generally do not compare further, although the 
Massachusetts regulations contain certain additional provisions.15 
From this brief comparison it is apparent that each agency would 
provide rather similar protection if the respective regulations were 
enforced with equal vigor. 
The new Section 49 of G.L., c. 93, ostensibly extends the regula-
tion of collection agencies, previously achieved through regulations 
issued by the commissioner of banks, to creditors doing their own col-
lecting where not subject to the commissioner's regulations. The list 
of specific practices in this statute is not nearly so long as that in the 
commissioner's regulations, but the list is not exclusive. Thus, those 
added practices in the commissioner's regulations fall within the gen-
eral prohibition of the new section. 
This new statute applies to creditors and their "assignees," which 
may well mean that it encompasses any third party collecting a debt 
for the creditor, including collection agencies. This is important 
because collection agencies subject to the commissioner's regulations 
and enforcement are not subject to consumer remedies, while con-
sumers under the new statute have remedies under Chapter 93A. 
Further, the general prohibition does not restrict consumers to the list 
of practices in either the statutes or the commissioner's regulations. A 
consumer is free to allege, and a court to hold, that other practices are 
unfair, unreasonable or deceptive. At the same time, each practice 
listed by regulation or statute must be tested in fact against the gen-
eral prohibition of unfair, unreasonable or deceptive practices. 
A particularly troublesome practice which is prohibited by the 
commissioner's regulations is communication with a third party con-
cerning the debt. The creditors or their collectors are free to reach 
a debtor at work or at home by telephone, but may not disclose to his 
employer or family why they are calling. If, however, by agreement, 
the debtor permits the collector to contact, for example, his wife or 
elder son, the communication can hardly be prohibited as unfair, 
deceptive or unreasonable. A blanket "waiver" clause in a credit agree-
ment, however, would be unenforceable as an unfair and deceptive 
practice. The allowed written permission must refer to a specific debt 
and be voluntary on the part of the debtor. Third parties with whom 
there may be no communication include strangers as well as persons 
known to the debtor. Thus, even envelopes must not evince a debt. 
A single communication at a particular time of day would not be 
13 FTC Regs. §§237.4-237.5. 
14 Id. §237.6. 
15 Mass. Banking Reg. Nos. 6, 7, 10, II ancl 17. 
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unreasonable, unless the debtor protested that it interfered with his 
normal activity. A debtor is as much entitled to relaxation after normal 
working hours as is a collector. Still, if the debtor works at irregular or 
unusual hours, communication at times when he would be available 
would not in itself be unfair or unreasonable. In short, creditors must 
adjust their collection practices to the particular debtor and the partic-
ular debt. 
Without pursuing further the specific practices addressed by the 
statute, it is safe to say that many customary collection techniques are 
now effectively proscribed. Collectors may resort primarily to written 
or oral requests and to appeals to a sense of moral and legaJ obligation. 
If a prohibited practice is not confined to a single debtor, the aggrieved 
debtor may employ the class action remedy of Chapter 93A to the 
considerable financial loss of the offending collector. 
During the 1970 SuRVEY year, another section was added to the pro-
visions regulating credit bureaus.t6 This new section creates liability 
in the form of damages for gross negligence in furnishing to a credit 
grantor erroneous credit information or information prohibited under 
G.L., c. 93, §46. Since Section 46A requires both proof of gross negli-
gence and proof of damages, it is of little practical use to the consumer. 
However, since violation of this section would result in an unfair or 
deceptive practice under Chapter 93A, the attorney general may take 
appropriate action, despite the problems raised by the heavy burden of 
proof. 
APPENDIX 
REGULATIONS ADOPTED MARCH 9, 1971, PURSUANT TO THE 
PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 885 OF THE AcTS OF 1970 
Pursuant to the Chapter of 885, Acts of 1970, and, in accordance 
with the provisions of General Laws, Chapter 30A, hearings were held 
by the Consumers' Council on February 25, 1971, due notice having 
been given to all interested persons, in accordance with the require-
ments of General Laws, Chapter 30A. 
All interested parti.es wishing to do so, having filed written com-
ments and having been permitted to testify at the hearing and all 
comments having beeri considered, the Consumers' Council adopts 
the following regulations for implementation of the Unit Pricing 
Act, adopted under Chapter 885, Acts of 1970 and further finds that 
the packaged commodities to be regulated, in accordance with Chapter 
885, Acts of 1970, are as set forth in paragraph 5 of the following 
regulations. 
16 Acts of 1970, c. 794, amending G.L., c. 93, by adding §46A, 
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1. Definitions. 
(a) "Packaged Commodity" means any food, drug, device or cos-
metic and any other article, product, or commodity of any kind or 
class which is customarily necessary or used for personal, family or 
household use and offered for sale at retail ~nd which is listed in 
paragraph 5, hereunder; 
(b) "Unit Price" means the price per measure. 
2. Exemptions. 
Sellers at retail need not comply with the provisions of these regu-
lations as to the following packaged commodities: 
(a) Medicine sold by prescription only; 
(b) Beverages subject to or complying with packaging or labeling 
requirements imposed under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act. 
(c) Such packaged commodities which are required to be marked 
individually with the cost per unit of weight under the provisions of 
General Laws, Chapter 94, Section 181. 
(d) Such packaged commodities which are sold in units of even 
pounds, pints, quarts, or gallons, and which have a retail price plainly 
marked thereon; but only the particular packaged commodity sold 
in such units shall be exempt. 
(e) Packaged commodities sold by any retail establishment operated 
by a person as his sole place of business shall be exempt from these 
regulations. 
3. Means of Disclosure. 
All retail establishments subject to these regulations shall disclose 
the price per measure to consumers in the following manner: 
(a) Attachment of an orange stamp, tag or label on the item itself, 
or directly under the item on the shelf on which the item is displayed, 
and conspicuously visible to the consumer, such orange stamp, tag or 
label carrying the following data and no other: 
(i) The words "Unit Price'~, as a heading. 
(ii) The designation of the price per measure, shall be expressed 
in terms of dollars or cents, as applicable, carried to three 
digits. 1£ the price is over $1.00, it may be expressed to the 
nearest full cent, provided that said price is rounded off from 
.005 and over to the next higher cent; and if .004 or less down 
to the next lower cent, but, that if it is expressed in cents, it be 
carried to three digits. Example: "25.3 cents per pound; $1.67 
per quart." 
(iii) The description of the packaged commodity by item and size 
of the unit being sold may also be included thereon at the 
option of the retail establishment. 
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(iv) In such items as paper products, which are manufactured in 
numbers of folds showing in addition to such other informa-
tion as may be required hereunder the applicable "ply" count 
or thickness customarily designated as "ply", by such packaged 
commodities. 
(b) If the packaged commodity is not conspicuously v[sible to the 
consumer, a list of the price per measure conspicuously placed near 
the point of purchase, or a sign or list of price per measure posted at or 
near the point of display, or by stamping or affixing the price per 
measure on the packaged commodity itself, provided that the date, 
color code and size requirements of paragraph 3(a) and (c) are met. 
(c) The size of the print of the legend required under the provisions 
of paragraph 3(a) and 3(b) and in any other place within the retail 
establishment, where the price of commodities regulated hereunder is 
displayed, the price per measure shall be displayed in type no smaller 
than that used for the price of the item, but, in no event shall such 
price per measure appear in a size less than 7 fl6" in height; PRO-
VIDED, that, if any retail establishment is unable to meet the mini-
mum size requirements, set forth herein, such retail establishment 
may apply to the Consumers' Council for permission to use a size and 
type no less than pica size for such periods of time as Consumers' 
Council may deem to be reasonable. 
(d) When the display space used for the packaged commodity is 
inadequate to set forth separate price legends as required hereunder, 
and where price designations are not customarily used for the com-
modities, the retailer may set forth such legends as are required 
hereunder on display cards or other material used for the display of 
prices for such commodities. The display of unit price shaJl appear on 
an orange background, be conspicuously visible, and the size of type 
used for the legend shall be no less than the size of the type used for the 
price of such packaged commodity. 
4. Price Per Measure. 
The price per measure required to be disclosed under these regula-
tions shall be: 
(a) Price per pound for commodities whose net quantity is cus-
tomarily expressed in units of pounds or ounces or both. 
(b) Price per pint, quart or gallon for commoditieB, whose net 
quantity is customarily expressed in units of pints, quarts, gallons or 
fluid ounces, or a combination thereof; provided, that the same unit 
of measure is used for the same commodity in all sizes sold in such 
retail establishment. 
(c) Price per 50 feet or per 50 square feet, as appropriate, for com-
modities and items whose net quantity is customarily expressed in 
units of feet, inches, square feet or square yards, or whose net quan-
tities are expressed in units of area or length. 
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(d) Price per 100 units of commodities, whose net quantity is ex-
pressed by a numerical count. 
5. Packaged Commodities Regulated. 
(a) The following commodities shall be labeled in accordance with 
these regulations no later than May 24, 1971. Thereafter, such com-
modities may not be sold in retail stores subject to these regulations 
unless the conditions of these regulations shall have been met. 
Detergents Oleomargarine 
Household cleansers, waxes, de- Coffee, instant and ground 
odorizers Cocoa 
Cereals Tea 
Instant breakfast foods Jellies, jams and sandwich spreads 
Butter 
(b) The following commodities shall be labeled in accordance with 
these regulations no later than July 19, 1971. Thereafter, such com-
modities may not be sold in retail stores subject to these regulations, 
unless the conditions of these regulations shall have been met. 
Fruits, vegetables, and juices- Aluminum and plastic wraps 
canned, jarred, boxed Spaghetti, noodles and pasta prod-
Pet foods ucts 
Baby foods Ketchups- mustards- sauces 
Shortenings Snack foods, such as potato chips, 
Flour pretzels, etc. 
Baking mixes and supplies Soups- canned and dry mixes 
Canned fish and meats 
Sanitary paper products, such as 
napkins, paper towels, tissues, 
etc. 
(c) The following commodities shall be labeled in accordance with 
these regulations no later than Sept. 20, 1971. Thereafter, such com-
modities may not be sold in retail stores subject to these regulations, 
unless the conditions of these regulations shall have been met. 
Frozen fruits, vegetables, and Cookies and crackers 
juices Salad Dressings 
Bread and pastry products Toothpaste 
Bottled beverages- carbonated Deodorants 
and non-carbonated Shampoos 
Flavored syrups and powdered Shaving Cream 
drink mixes 
Retail sales of food made from bulk, if the quantity is weighed, 
measured or counted at the time of such sale by the retailer such as 
Cold cuts Fish products and meat 
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6. Extension of Time for Compliance. 
(a) Any retail establishment which is unable to comply with these 
regulations within the time set forth herein, may apply to the Con-
sumers' Council for permission to extend such time for compliance 
for a period not to exceed thirty days. Such retail establishment shall 
set forth, in as much detail as possible, the reasons for its inability to 
comply. The Consumers' Council may extend such period from time 
to time, upon such terms and conditions as it may deem reasonable. 
(b) Exemption from compliance with the requirements of any of 
the provisions of paragraph 3 may be granted for cause by the Con-
sumers' Council, upon the filing of a statement, setting forth the 
reason for inability to comply with any of the requirements of para-
graph 3. Such exemption shall be granted by the Consumers' Council 
for such period of time as it may deem reasonable. 
7. Responsibility for Compliance. 
In the event of a violation of these regulations, the manager, or 
person in charge of such retail establishment and the pexson employ-
ing such manager or person in charge, where applicable, shall be 
deemed to be responsible for compliance by such retail establishment 
with the requirements of these regulations. 
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